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Preface  
 
This thesis has been prepared as the concluding part of my study for a Master’s degree in 
Societal Safety (Samfunnsikkerhet) at the University of Stavanger. The thesis comprises two 
articles written in collaboration with my supervisor, professor Terje Aven. Both papers have 
been submitted for possible publication in international scientific journals. The main goal of 
the two articles has been to see different risk regulation regimes and diverging ways to 
perceive and judge risk in connection to two main theoretical risk perspectives. We have used 
examples of electromagnetic radiation to substantiate the dicussions in both papers.  
 
I would like to thank professor Terje Aven for being inspirational and helpful in the process 
of writing this Master thesis. Without his gudiance and motivation these papers would never 
have seen the light of the day. I am very grateful for what I have learned throughout this 
process. 
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Summary and conclusions 
 
The following issues are discussed in this thesis:  
 
1. Risk perspectives  
 
2. Risk regulation 
 
3. Risk perception and judgements 
 
The first paper treats the two first issues, the second paper looks into the first and the third 
issue. Both papers consider two main risk perspectives; an alternative and a traditional 
perspective. The main principles of these perspectives can be summarised as follows:  
 
1. In the traditional perspective the main component of risk is probability, and this 
probability is interpreted as an objective property of the activity being studied.  The 
aim of the risk analysis is to estimate these probabilities.   
2. In the alternative perspective the main component of risk is uncertainty, and 
probability is considered a knowledge-based (subjective) tool for expressing these 
uncertainties. It is acknowledged that risk extends beyond probabilities.  
Paper I provides comparisons with and links between different risk regulation regimes and 
these two risk perspectives. Paper II focuses on contrasting ways to perceive, assess and judge 
risks and how these can be described by the different risk perspectives.  
 
 
Paper I: On the link between risk perspectives and risk regulation – a comparison 
between two cases concerning base stations and wireless networks 
 
In this paper we study how two diverging regimes of risk regulation can be linked to 
fundamental theoretical concepts about risk. The discussion is illustrated by drawing 
comparisons between the risk regulation concerning wireless networks and base stations of 
Salzburg municipality and that of Stavanger municipality. We find that the traditional risk 
perspective can be compared to and tied to the risk regulation of Stavanger municipality 
concerning these technologies. Here, the form of risk regulation adopted is mainly governed 
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by staying within limits of exposure. Salzburg has adopted a more precautionary approach to 
their regulation of sources emitting electromagnetic radiation (EMR), and is best described by 
the alternative perspective where uncertainty constitutes the main component of risk.  
 
 
Paper II: The link between risk perception and risk perspectives – illustrated bt the 
exapmle of electromagnetic radiation 
 
The second paper is related to the first paper but here we link the risk perspectives to two 
main categories of risk perception and judgments, more specifically to those of laymen and 
those of experts. We continue to use the example of EMR to illustrate the discussion. The 
nature and characteristics of electromagnetic radiation as a source of risks are typically found 
to produce high risk perceptions among laypeople and low risk estimates among experts.  
The paper argues that the risk perceptions of laypeople better match the alternative 
perspective than the traditional perspective on risk. Laypeople often range technological risks 
as high, despite the fact that risk assessments indicate differently. Perceptional factors linked 
to the acknowledgments of uncertainties play an important role. The way experts define and 
assess risks is more in line with the traditional perspective on risk. Experts rely on the results 
of risk assessments to a greater extent than lay-men. The contrasting points of view 
concerning EMR between these two groups can be seen a result of the degree to which they 
focus on the different components of the risk concept. Laymen focus on uncertainties and 
consequences, whereas the experts typically emphasize probabilities. This corresponds with 
the weight put on the different components of the risk concept in the two risk perspectives.  
 
Both the division between different risk regulation regimes and between experts and lay-men 
can be linked to two contrasting traditions and sets of ”thinking”. The alternative perspective 
challenges the main line of thinking behind common risk practise. A perspective where the 
main component of risk is uncertainty and not probability, like the alternative perspective, 
means a shift in thinking from traditional risk estimation based on probabilities to uncertainty 
characterizations.  To many this perspective can be found to represent a new paradigm in that 
it allows for questions to be asked concerning existing knowledge, methods and established 
“truths”.  Both papers suggest that the alternative perspective provides a better platform when 
addressing risks characterized by large uncertainties and where important stakes are at risk, 
like in the case of EMR. 
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On the link between risk perspectives and risk regulation - a comparison 
between two cases concerning base stations and wireless networks  
 
L. Fjæran Nygaard and T. Aven, University of Stavanger, Norway  
 
Abstract  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how risk regulation is related to fundamental concepts 
about risk. It distinguishes between two risk perspectives: a traditional risk perspective where 
risk is considered an objective property of the activity studied and an alternative perspective 
where uncertainty is the main component of risk.  The discussion is substantiated by drawing 
comparisons between two cases, namely the risk regulation concerning wireless networks and 
base stations of Salzburg municipality and that of Stavanger municipality. Salzburg, in having 
adopted a more precautionary approach to their regulation of sources emitting electromagnetic 
radiation, represents a more proactive form of risk management. Uncertainty constitutes not 
only an integral, but also a crucial part of decisions and decision-making processes, and gives 
grounds for the precautious measures that are taken by regulating authorities. Stavanger can 
be characterised as more reactive than Salzburg, in that its risk regulation heavily relies on 
some defined limiting values and is, to a large extent, guided by staying within these. Here, 
electromagnetic radiation is not perceived by many central parties as a real risk to our health. 
This has direct implications for the degree of regulatory intervention and measures taken (or 
not taken). The risk regulations of Salzburg and Stavanger are based on different pools of 
scientific evidence and different sets of assumptions, the result being two different “worlds” 
of risk regulation. In this paper we show that the traditional risk perspective and the 
alternative risk perspective to a large extent support the risk regulation of the Stavanger and 
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Salzburg cases respectively. We conclude that the alternative perspective provides the best 
foundation for regulation in situations like the one studied with large uncertainties and stakes 
involved.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper addresses the issue of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) in relation to base stations and 
wireless networks. EMR is energy propagated through space between electric and magnetic fields. 
These fields produce waves of various lengths and frequencies (strengths) and the result is different 
types of EMR: microwaves, x-rays and radio waves etc. Both wireless networks and base stations are 
sources of electromagnetic radiation. Base stations use a frequency from 900 to about 2600 MHz and a 
transmitting effect of 0.5-20 Watt. Wireless networks use around 2400 MHz, but the transmitting 
effect is lower than for base stations. But as the distance is much lower, the received effect to the body 
might be of the same range as with base stations. The level of radiation produced by both is similar 
and the discussion in this paper holds for both sources of EMR. 
 
The widespread use of technologies emitting EMR and the potential for adverse health effects due to 
EMR are subject to considerable debate. EMR represents an emerging health issue and has created a 
growing body of concerned citizens. There are, however, diverging opinions within the scientific 
community concerning the potential health consequences of these technologies. A multitude of reports 
providing contradictory conclusions is available. Some show no health effects following exposure to 
electromagnetic radiation. For example, the WHO (2006) found that “…there exists no element of 
scientific proof confirming possible harmful effects on health of base stations and wireless networks”. 
Others demonstrate the reverse; here the effects range from cancer to concentration and sleeping 
problems. These two stands dominate the picture. Both are often found to brand the studies; 
documentation and results produced by the other position are considered as illegitimate and in some 
cases as unscientific. In Slovic’s words: “New evidence appears reliable and informative if it is 
consistent with one’s initial beliefs, contrary evidence is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous or 
unrepresentative” (Slovic et al. 1979:72). Alternative paradigms represent a threat to the current 
paradigmatic position and will consequently meet resistance due to their potential to undermine 
existing knowledge and affect what is considered as legitimate research. Subsequently, reports and 
documentation heavily relied on by some, are neglected by others. 
 
A lot of research stresses the need for precautionary measures to be taken and the most frequently 
referred to is the The BioInitiative Report (2007). The scientific report reviews more than 2000 studies 
where various health risks from exposure to wireless technologies are analysed. It voices a serious 
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concern about the present exposure limits and holds that these are inadequate to protect people. On the 
other hand, there are researchers finding that a certain degree of exposure yields beneficial health 
effects (e.g. Luckey 1991). Still others seek new and different measures in order to provide more 
reliable evidence, for example methods of proteomics (Leszczynski 2006). 
 
The intrinsic characteristics and nature of the risk in question (involuntary, high consequence, 
invisible, unfamiliar, irreversible, man-made) are typically found to produce a high risk perception 
among the general population. Conversely, it is likely to be conceived as a low risk by many experts 
due to the low estimated probability of consequences. In other words, the nature of the risk is 
contested.   
 
The issue we raise in this paper is how to regulate this risk. This is obviously a challenge due to the 
large uncertainties related to the health effects of base stations and wireless networks. Risk is assessed 
differently by different actors. Technological development and economic profit could be seen in 
conflict with issues of protection and safety. Policymakers and regulators need to prioritize, weigh and 
balance diverging considerations.  
 
Risk regulation comprises a wide range of activities. Hood et al (2001) distinguish between context 
and content, but consider both equally important components of risk regulation. Context is the setting 
in which the regulation takes place. This is about the type of risk in question, the public attitudes and 
perceptions towards it, the various actors affected by and producing the risk. The context can also 
shape the content of risk regulation, which treats the degree of regulation, the threshold values that 
determine what are acceptable or tolerable risk,  and the organization and structure of the regulating 
regime. It also takes into consideration the style of the regulation: namely the conventions and 
attitudes of the regulating actors. The content dimension of risk regulation is the most central to the 
aim of the paper.  
 
Risk regulation is strongly dependent on the risk perspective adopted. The degree to which uncertainty 
is recognized as a central component of the risk perspective by regulatory agencies, shapes the form 
and degree of regulatory intervention. An illustration of this is the diverging legislative positions that 
are taken in various countries, the inconsistencies in accepted levels of risk and reliance on different 
safety standards. In this paper we look more closely into the importance of the risk perspectives for 
risk regulation by considering the empirical cases of Salzburg and Stavanger. The Salzburg and 
Stavanger cases provide examples of two completely different regulation regimes and in the paper we 
question to what extent these can be traced back to differences in the underlying view on risk.  
 
The complexity of risk regulation is emphasized by many analysts and researchers, and can be 
illustrated by the following citation of Power (2004): “Research has shown that there is very 
considerable variety in the manner in which risks are processed by state agencies; the ‘government of 
risk’ is by no means uniform across problems and functions, with public perceptions,  moral 
frameworks,  institutional arrangements and the nature of the risk itself giving rise to variation in ‘risk 
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regimes’” (Power 2004:19). Similar conclusions are made by Baldwin et al. (2000). They argue that 
risk regulation is not straightforward because of varying definitions of risk and different views on 
what are appropriate limits of tolerability of risk. These are just examples of researchers who have 
addressed the issue of risk and risk regulation. However, not much attention has been devoted to the 
link between risk perspective and risk regulation. Perhaps the closest connection is provided by the 
work of Bartle (2008) where risk regulation and decision-making are analysed based on a scientific-
technocratic and socio-political model. In the former model the processes of risk regulation and 
decision-making are led by experts and are characterised by the use of an objective risk concept. The 
socio-political model of risk regulation and decision-making is associated with more nuanced 
strategies. Here, subjective and objective dimensions of risk are not readily separable. An objective 
risk is not easily conceived and quantified. When using this approach, the risk regulation is “best off” 
by being a democratic process characterised by dialogue.   
 
HSE (2001) and Renn (2005) also establish relationships between risk management policies and 
various uncertainty dimensions. See also Steen and Aven (2008). The main purpose of the HSE (2001) 
approach is to set out an overall framework for decision-making by the Health and Safety Executive 
and explain the basis for HSE’s decisions regarding the degree and form of regulatory control of risk 
from occupational hazards. However, the framework is general and can also be used for other types of 
applications. The approaches for handling uncertainties are illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical axis 
represents increasing uncertainty in the likelihood that the harmful consequences of a particular event 
will be realised, while the horizontal axis represents increasing uncertainty in the consequences 
attached to the particular event. At the lower left corner, a risk assessment can be undertaken with 
assumptions whose robustness can be tested by a variety of methods. However, as one moves along 
the axis assumptions are increasingly made that are precautionary in nature and which cannot be tested 
(HSE 2001).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Procedures for handling uncertainty (HSE 2001) 
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 Several researchers have used a similar model to link risk management policies and uncertainty 
dimensions, e.g. Stirling and Gee (2002). These researchers provide an interesting discussion of the 
precautionary principle by seeing the uncertainty dimension (referred to as incertitude) in relation to 
the strengths and weaknesses of risk assessments, as well as to the fundamental dimensions of 
incertitude. The precautionary principle applies in situations where we have poor knowledge about the 
likelihoods, and the outcomes are poorly defined.  Also Hom et al. (2008) discuss the precautionary 
principle and risk regulation. They explicitly tie variations encountered in risk regulation regimes to 
differences in adaptations and interpretations of the precautionary principle resulting in regulatory 
actors allowing different levels of emissions of EMR, both within and amongst countries. 
 
The risk governance framework (Renn 2005) has been developed to provide structure and guidance on 
how to assess and handle risk on the societal level. It distinguishes between different types of 
situations (risk problems), according to the degree of complexity (Simple – Complex), Uncertainty 
and Ambiguity (Aven and Renn 2009b):  
 
Simplicity is characterised by situations and problems with low complexity, uncertainties and 
ambiguities.  
Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links between a multitude of 
potential causal agents and specific observed effects. 
Uncertainty refers to the difficulty of predicting the occurrence of events and/or their consequences 
based on incomplete or invalid databases, possible changes of the causal chains and their context 
conditions, extrapolation methods when making inferences from experimental results, modelling 
inaccuracies or variations in expert judgments. Uncertainty may result from an incomplete or 
inadequate reduction of complexity, and it often leads to expert dissent about the risk characterisation.  
Ambiguity refers to different views related to the relevance, meaning and implications of the risk 
assessments for decision-making (interpretative ambiguity); or the values to be protected and the 
priorities to be made (normative ambiguity). This can be illustrated by a few examples. What does it 
mean, for example, if neuronal activities in the human brain are intensified when subjects are exposed 
to electromagnetic radiation? Can this be interpreted as an adverse effect or is it just a bodily response 
without any health implication? 
 
For the different risk problem categories, the IRGC framework specifies a management strategy, 
appropriate instruments and stakeholder participation. See Table 1 below which indicates the 
recommendations for the category uncertainty and ambiguity. These recommendations are in line with 
the findings of, for example, Bartle (2008) in that both find stakeholder participation, extended 
dialogue and information important strategies and measures in uncertain situations.  
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Table 1: Risk problem categories - uncertainty and ambiguity induced example - implications for risk 
management (Aven and Renn 2009b, adapted from Renn (2005)) 
Risk problem 
category  
Management strategy Appropriate instruments  Stakeholder participation  
Uncertainty 
induced risk 
problems 
Risk informed and  
Caution/Precaution based  
(risk agent) 
Risk assessments. Broad risk   
characterisations, highlighting  
uncertainties and features like  
persistence, ubiquity etc. 
 
Tools include: 
• Containment 
• ALARP (as low as reasonably 
possible) 
• BACT (best available control 
technology), etc. 
Reflective discourse: Include the 
main stakeholders in the evaluation 
process and search for consensus on 
the extra margin of safety in which 
they would be willing to invest in 
exchange for avoiding potentially 
catastrophic consequences. 
Deliberation relying on a collective 
reflection about balancing the 
possibilities for over- and under-
protection. 
 Risk informed. 
Robustness and Resilience 
focused  
(risk absorbing system)  
Risk assessments. Broad risk   
characterizations.  
 Improving capability to cope with 
surprises 
• Diversity of means to accomplish 
desired benefits 
• Avoiding high vulnerabilities 
• Allowing for flexible responses 
• Preparedness for adaptation 
 
Ambiguity 
induced risk 
problems 
Risk informed and  
Discourse based 
Political processes.  
Application of conflict resolution 
methods for reaching consensus or 
tolerance for risk evaluation results 
and management option selection 
Participative discourse: competing 
arguments, beliefs and values are 
openly discussed. 
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• Integration of stakeholder 
involvement in reaching closure 
• Emphasis on communication and 
social discourse 
 
 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  In Section 2 we give a short review of risk perspectives as a 
background for the discussions in the coming sections. We focus on risk perspectives: the traditional 
risk perspective where probability is the main component of risk and an alternative risk perspective 
where uncertainty is the main component of risk. We argue that these perspectives are different from 
the scientific-technocratic and the socio-political model presented, for example, in Bartle (2008).  In 
Section 3 we introduce the cases of Salzburg and Stavanger. These will be linked and compared with 
respect to risk perspectives and risk regulation in Section 4. Here, we will also provide a more general 
discussion concerning risk perspectives and risk regulation. Finally, in Section 5 we draw some 
normative implications concerning choice of risk perspective, and we conclude.  
 
 
 
2. Basic introduction to risk perspectives      
Many perspectives on risk exist (see e.g. Aven and Renn 2009a). In this paper we distinguish 
between the following two main categories:   
3. The main component of risk is probability, and this probability is interpreted as an 
objective property of the activity being studied.  This perspective is referred to as the 
traditional risk perspective.    
4. The main component of risk is uncertainty, and probability is considered a knowledge-
based (subjective) tool for expressing these uncertainties. It is acknowledged that risk 
extends beyond probabilities. This perspective is referred to as the alternative risk 
perspective.  
In the traditional risk perspective, risk is defined by a probability or probability distribution, 
expressing stochastic or aleatory uncertainties.  A population of similar situations to the one 
studied are constructed and the probability p of an event A equals the fraction of situations 
where A occurs. The probability p is unknown and is estimated based on “hard data”, i.e. 
measurements related to the occurrence of A for similar situations. Analogously, we define a 
probability distribution pX associated with a random variable X. Modelling of the phenomena 
may also be used, linking the probability p to a set of parameters q on a more detailed system 
level.  More generally, we may consider the perspective based on a probability model F which 
is assumed dependent on some unknown parameters µ.  The estimation of µ is based on 
traditional statistical methods, e.g. regression analysis.   
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Hence, risk is defined by p and pX, and the associated risk description covers the estimates of 
these quantities. Uncertainties of these estimates relative to the “true” values of p should be 
addressed but are often neglected or restricted to simple confidence intervals reflecting only 
statistical variation.  
In the alternative risk perspective, uncertainty and not probability is the main component of risk.  
Different definitions of risk can support such a perspective, as discussed in Aven and Renn (2009a) 
and Aven (2008).  In this paper we adopt the following perspective (Aven 2008):  
 
By risk we understand the two-dimensional combination of 
i) events A and the consequences of these events C, and 
ii) the associated uncertainties U (will A occur and what value will C take?)          (I) 
 
We refer to this as the (A,C,U) perspective.  
 
We may rephrase this definition by saying that risk associated with an activity is to be understood as 
(Aven and Renn 2009a): 
 
Uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity    (I’).  
 
Here, severity refers to intensity, size, extension, scope and other potential measures of magnitude, 
and is with respect to something that humans value (lives, the environment, money, etc.). Losses and 
gains, for example expressed by money or the number of fatalities, are ways of defining the severity of 
the consequences. The uncertainties relate to the events and consequences, the severity is just a way of 
characterising the consequences ( Aven and Renn 2009a).  
 
The main features of this risk perspective are illustrated in Figure 2.1.     
 
Activity
Events and 
consequences
(outcomes)
Uncertainty
Risk 
Values at stake Values at stake 
Severity
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the risk definition (Aven and Renn 2009a) 
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 It is acknowledged that risk extends beyond probabilities. Probability is considered a knowledge-based 
(subjective) tool for expressing these uncertainties. If the probability equals 0.1 (say), this means that 
the assessor compares his/her uncertainty (degree of belief) about the occurrence of the event A with 
the standard of drawing at random a specific ball from an urn that contains 10 balls (Lindley 2006). A 
risk description based on this perspective includes the following elements: (A,C,U,P,K), where A 
refers to the initiating event, C represents the consequences given occurrence of the event A, U is the 
uncertainty about A and C, P is the probability of specific events and  consequences, and K is the 
background knowledge (assumptions etc.) that the probabilities are based on.   
 
Hence objective risk and objective risk descriptions do not exist, as the U component is epistemic. The 
risk description (A,C,U,P,K) covers probability distributions of A and C, as well as predictions of A 
and C, for example a predictor C* given by the expected value of C, unconditionally or conditional on 
the occurrence of A, i.e. C* = EC or C* = E[C|A].   
 
The distinction we make between these risk perspectives resembles the common dichotomy in risk 
regulation modelling, as summarised by Bartle (2008) and mentioned in Section 1: the science-
technocratic model and the socio-political model. However, a further look into the building blocks of 
these models shows important differences compared to the risk perspectives studied in the present 
paper.  
 
The science-technocratic model sees risk and uncertainty as two different concepts, in line with the 
classic work by Knight (1921). Under risk, the probability distribution of the quantities of interest can 
be assigned objectively, whereas under uncertainty these probabilities must be assigned or estimated 
on a subjective basis. To us, however, uncertainty is a main component of risk.  The Knightian 
terminology is in conflict with the common interpretation of risk and should not, in our view, be used 
(Holten 2004, Aven 2003).   Referring to the former situation as risk and the latter as uncertainty is 
unfortunate as it would exclude the risk concept from most situations of interest.  We seldom in 
practice have known, objective distributions, and should we adopt Knight’s definition we cannot refer 
to the risk concept in these situations. If we adopt the subjective or Bayesian perspective on 
probability, Knight’s definition of risk becomes empty. There are no objective probabilities. The 
terminology violates the intuitive interpretation of risk, which is related to situations of uncertainty 
and lack of predictability.  
 
Furthermore, the science-technocratic model is based on the “risk = statistical expected value” thesis. 
However, expected value decision-making is misleading for rare and extreme events (e.g. Haimes 
2004, Aven and Renn 2009b). The expected value (the mean or the central tendency) does not 
adequately capture events with low probabilities and high consequences. All risk perspectives that we 
consider are seeing beyond expected values.     
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The science-technocratic model makes a sharp distinction between objective risk and subjective 
(perceived) risk.  However, the presumed objective risk is not known and, hence, the interesting 
comparison is between risk assessed by experts on the one hand and perceived risk on the other.  It is 
also essential to distinguish between assigned subjective probabilities (and related risk assignments) 
and risk perception. The main difference is that risk perception is based on personal beliefs, effects 
and experiences irrespective of their validity. Subjective probabilities used in risk assessments are 
representations of individual and collective uncertainty assessments based on available statistical data, 
direct experience, models and theoretical approximations which all need justification that must also be 
plausible to others (Aven and Renn 2009a).  The risk perspectives that we consider are precise on 
these issues, in contrast to much of the literature on common risk regulation models, which contrasts 
objective risk and subjective (perceived) risk.  
 
The socio-political model gives weight to people’s risk perception – it can make as much sense as 
assessed risk by professionals. However, the probabilistic framework adopted is not defined. Rejecting 
the idea of objective probabilities and risk does not mean that we cannot use probabilities to assess 
uncertainties. Subjective probabilities are a recognised tool for this purpose and the risk perspectives 
analysed in the present paper clarify their role in the risk assessment and risk management.   
 
The socio-political model acknowledges the limitations of the probabilistic analyses. The probabilities 
cannot be ascribed with certainty. The model is criticising the “risk = statistical expected value” thesis 
but also the lack of objectivity of probability assignments. However, as mentioned above, the socio-
political model does not present a risk perspective which defines risk and probability in line with the 
ideas of the model.  
 
 
3.  The Salzburg and Stavanger cases 
No coherent framework exists on how to regulate the risk of EMR. There is a complete lack 
of agreement and standardisation between countries in relation to EMR regulation (Hom et al. 
2009).  Also within countries, there are contradictory views on how to regulate the matter. We 
find disagreements at state, regional and local level. The two cases studied in this paper, 
Salzburg and Stavanger, display two different sets of local arrangements. The cases are 
selected because they represent two diverging positions regarding risk regulation concerning 
EMR. Each case represents one end of the extreme regarding both the form and degree of 
their risk regulation. It is important to be aware that many other countries have similar risk 
regulation to that of Norway and Stavanger and that more precautionary cases than Salzburg 
exist (e.g. Germany, Lichtenstein). The contrasts between the cases are sought to highlight the 
topic of this paper: the link between risk regulation and risk perspectives. 
 
3.1 Risk regulation of Salzburg 
Salzburg has adopted a precautionary approach to its risk regulation in lowering the permitted 
level of exposure to electromagnetic radiation (0.6 volts per meter V/m).  In Salzburg one also 
distinguishes between permitted levels of radiation inside and outside, the permitted level of 
exposure inside is lower (0.02 V/m) than outside (0.06 V/m). These marginal values diverge 
from those used by the Austrian government which allows levels of radiation close to those 
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provided by ICNIRP (International Commission of Non-Ionising Radiation Protection). The 
marginal values set by Salzburg are far below the standards set by ICNIRP (which allows 
values between 28 and 61 V/m depending on frequency). Salzburg municipality does not 
accept the ICNIRP’s marginal values for EMR. They find these outdated and inadequate to 
protect its citizens. Furthermore, the Public Health Department of Salzburg Region officially 
advises schools, kindergartens etc. not to implement wireless networks (Oberfeld 2005). 
Additionally, a political resolution to remove all wireless networks from all primary and 
secondary schools has just recently been passed (Klock 2009). Other schools in Salzburg are 
the responsibility of the Austrian state. Plans are also being made to regulate the issue of 
EMR from wireless networks in the regional school law (primary and secondary schools 
(Klock 2009). El-sensitivity is officially accepted as a medical diagnosis, and a formal 
medical procedure of diagnosis and treatment is currently being made by a working group 
consisting of members from the Austrian Medical Association.   
Every planned deployment of base stations in Salzburg close to sensitive areas (these being 
areas where people stay for longer periods of time, for example schools, flats, workplaces 
etc.) is required to provide data on V/m and levels of EMR and on location concerning 
vicinity to buildings. The operators must negotiate and discuss with local authorities in order 
to arrive at the best suited location for base stations, these being as far away from sensitive 
areas as possible. All stakeholders in the surroundings of 300 – 500 metres of the planned 
location of a base station are informed and have a say in the matter before decisions are 
reached. The plans for the base station remain open for everyone to see for four weeks. This 
procedure was established in 1995 by the town government and has been followed since. Still 
there is no law regulating this. 
In Salzburg “The BioInitiative report” (2007) and research providing knowledge about 
adverse health effects are heavily relied upon. Decisions and measures are taken in favour of 
uncertainties and the potential seriousness of consequences. Information about regulatory 
measures and possible effects of EMR is provided to the public through the local government 
by, for example, giving information and official recommendations. 
 
3.2 The risk regulation of Stavanger 
The situation in Stavanger is different. Stavanger operates with radically different marginal 
values regarding exposure to electromagnetic radiation from those of Salzburg. The 
Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency (NPRA) has adopted the limits set by ICNIRP 
(1999). These permit the highest degree of electromagnetic radiation internationally (5.8 
V/m), but are used by many other countries. Stavanger is in the process of implementing 
wireless networks in all primary schools and in the many public buildings. Base stations are 
placed without informing or consulting stakeholders and many are placed in sensitive areas, 
for example on roofs of apartments, workplaces and kindergartens. Information about location 
of base stations is not readily available and many do not know where these are placed. 
Information on this has long been withheld and claimed to be a matter of safety for the 
Norwegian state. This has resulted in a growing body of frustrated and concerned 
stakeholders. The media picture is characterised by divergent opinions, aggressive “attacks” 
between authorities and laymen. The debate is initiated from the “bottom-up” by interest 
groups, parents, workers, teachers etc. The municipal Chief of Health and Care does not 
recognize their concern regarding EMR and potential health consequences (Bjørlow and 
Haarr 2008). Action is not justified and not taken by the local authorities as long as 
measurements of EMR are below the level of the marginal values. The risk regulation is 
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characterised as being more reactive and the risk is understood in a different manner from that 
in Salzburg. It relies on marginal values and does not question the judgements made by the 
NRPA (Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency). Decisions are taken isolated from 
stakeholders. Here, el-sensitivity is not recognised as a medical diagnosis. NPRA holds that 
el-sensitivity is a “myth”; this is due to the fact that no evidence of a causal relationship can 
be proved. NPRA and Stavanger do not recognize much of the information on which Salzburg 
bases its decisions (SSV 2008).   
In Stavanger, the risk communication between authorities and citizens is, to a large extent, 
characterised by the citizens voicing their concerns through the media. The debate is 
characterized by verbal attacks, frustration, the assigning of blame and discussions of 
responsibility. There has long been a clear distance between authorities and the concerned 
public.  
This illustrates the differences between the attitudes and conventions of the regulating actors 
of Salzburg and Stavanger. The issue addresses the content dimension in Hood et al.’s (2001) 
risk regulation regime.  
Just recently the chief administrative officer of Stavanger publicly recommended in the local 
newspaper the use of cabled network as a precautionary measure (Stavanger Aftenblad 2009). 
However, this recommendation will not be followed if the costs are judged as large compared 
to the benefits of continuing using wireless networks. The precautionary measures will not 
apply to schools as the benefits of using wireless networks are considered too great. The chief 
administrative officer of Stavanger informs that investigations will be conducted to see if 
there are legal grounds to introduce requirements to apply for deploying base stations. This 
may indicate that things are stirring in Stavanger, but the practical reality of the risk 
regulation has not yet been affected.   
 
 
4. Discussion of the link between risk perspectives and risk regulation  
The crucial point of the discussion in this paper is uncertainties and how one relates to these. 
These uncertainties are epistemic, i.e. a result of lack of knowledge, and are related to a 
certain point of time where decision-making about what measures to be taken, is required. As 
earlier emphasized, the information base concerning public health effects due to exposure to 
EMR is not conclusive and is, in many cases, contradictory.      
Table 2 (next page) summarizes the main distinctions between the two risk perspectives 
considered and provides links to risk regulation. It will be used as a reference for the 
discussion in this section. The risk regulations of Salzburg and Stavanger are not founded on 
specified risk perspectives. However, we will argue that the regulations fit in with the two 
main lines of thinking described in Section 2.   
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Table 2:  Characterisation of the two risk perspectives considered and links to risk regulation  
Risk 
perspective  
Characterisation of the 
perspective  
Possible link to risk management policies  
     
Traditional 
risk 
perspective  
Focus on 
estimation of 
“objective” 
probabilities 
and risk  
The background 
knowledge K 
that the 
probability  
estimates are 
based on is 
narrow in the 
sense that it is  
based on “hard 
data” only  
 
A null 
hypothesis is 
assumed to be 
true:  the 
activity is safe, 
the probability 
P of an 
adverse event 
is below a 
threshold P0.  
Strong 
evidence is 
needed to 
prove that  
P > P0 and 
thus the risk is 
too high   
The cautionary and 
precautionary principles play 
no important role. They are not 
considered consistent with the 
scientific method  
 
People’s risk perception not 
given much weight    
 
Cost-benefit type of analysis 
provides strong decision 
guidance     
         
Alternative 
risk 
perspective  
(A,C,U) 
Focus on  
description of 
uncertainties  
All types of 
information and 
knowledge are 
used as a basis 
for the 
uncertainty 
description 
 
There is no 
underlying 
hypothesis 
about the 
activity being 
safe or not  
 
The cautionary and 
precautionary principles are 
given strong weight 
 
People’s risk perception 
considered an important input 
to the uncertainty 
characterisation    
 
Cost-benefit type of analysis is 
recognised as a decision 
support tool, but it is 
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acknowledged that the 
analyses do not adequately  
reflect uncertainties and risk  
  
 
 
4.1 What risk perspective supports the risk regulation of Stavanger? 
In the case of Stavanger, decisions are based on the assumption that EMR does not represent a 
risk to our health as long as exposure does not exceed the marginal values set by ICNIRP and 
adopted by the NPRA. This is the null hypothesis of Stavanger. The regulatory actors heavily 
rely on the fact that research has not yet been able to prove a causal relationship between 
EMR and public health effects. Consequently, knowledge that is not able to demonstrate that 
this null hypothesis is not true is not given weight in the risk management.  
Using a traditional statistical set-up, we may formulate the null hypothesis as a statement of the 
probability P of an adverse event to be below a threshold P0, see Table 2. Only if sufficient data exist 
“proving” P > P0, can it be concluded that the safety level is unacceptable. Errors of type I (rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is true) are considered more serious than errors of type II (accepting a null 
hypothesis when it is false). In other words, it is more serious to wrongly conclude that EMR is not 
safe, than to wrongly conclude that EMR is safe. This is, of course, a highly controversial stand but is 
often associated with the traditional perspective. Proponents of this perspective would argue that only 
by such a perspective can innovation and progress in society be ensured; the uncertainties should not 
be given too much focus. This view is also supported by cost-benefit analyses which are based on 
expected net present value calculations and give little weight to uncertainties (Aven and Vinnem 
2007). Consequently, the cautionary and precautionary principles play no important role in the risk 
management in this case. The cautionary principle (HSE 2001, Aven and Vinnem 2007) expresses that 
in the face of risks and uncertainties, caution should be the ruling principle. The precautionary 
principle may be viewed as a special case of the cautionary principle and is applicable when there is a 
lack of scientific certainty about what will be the consequences of an activity. 
 
The ALARP principle is an example of how the cautionary principle can be implemented in practice. 
This principle holds that risks should be reduced to levels that are As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(HSE 2001). The principle states that risk-reducing measures should be implemented provided that 
one cannot demonstrate that the costs of implementing these measures are in gross disproportion to the 
benefits gained. Thus, the burden of proof is reversed. A safety measure should normally be 
implemented. This means a trade-off between safety and costs, but the principle puts safety first. 
Application of the ALARP principle could, in theory, also produce a rationale for implementing 
precautionary measures for the Stavanger case. However, as the effect of these measures on the “true” 
risk is typically considered small, the gross disproportion criterion applies and the measures are not 
justified.  Hence, a possible implementation of the ALARP principle would not necessarily lead to 
changes in the risk regulation in Stavanger.   
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The premise for the traditional risk perspective is the null hypothesis that EMR is safe, and a 
judgment of risk concluding that the available evidence is not strong enough to “prove” that 
EMR is not safe. Precautious measures are not to be justified in Stavanger until EMR is 
proved detrimental to public health. Hence, there is no basis for increased regulatory 
intervention as long as values are kept inside the limits established by the marginal values. 
Limited weight is given to uncertainties in the risk regulation of Stavanger. This can be 
illustrated by the Chief of Health and Care claiming that no risk exists and that, therefore, no 
measures need to be taken (e.g. Bjørlow and Haarr 2008). The focus is on the non-existence 
of reports to demonstrate the causal relationship between EMR and damage to health. 
Accordingly, when faced with people claiming to be el-sensitive, the regulatory actors point 
out that this can not be proved causally. People’s perceptions of EMR as a risk source are not 
given strong weight. This can also be found to be in line with the idea of risk as an objective 
property existing independently of us. The search for certainty and objectivity which is 
associated with the traditional perspective supports this belief and faith in the marginal value 
approach.  
Formalised risk assessments have not been conducted in the Stavanger case and as long as the 
regulatory actors do not believe EMR to represent a risk, no rationale exists for conducting such 
assessments. If, however, such assessments were to be conducted, it would be likely that they would 
be conducted in line with the traditional perspective. Here, estimated probabilities are derived based 
on historical data, for example earlier cases of brain tumours due to EMR and standard statistical 
inference methods are commonly used (e.g. confidence intervals) to express the uncertainties based on 
these data. In the traditional perspective, a key quantity of interest is the uncertainties between the true 
underlying values of the probabilities and the estimates of these probabilities, and a comprehensive 
risk assessment would have addressed these uncertainties. However, prevailing risk assessment 
practice often hides or camouflages these uncertainties (Reid 1992, Stirling 2007, Renn 1998, Aven 
2008). In this way, risk estimates are generated with a stronger basis than justified. Given the constant 
redefinition of the state of knowledge and the fact that situations that may seem unlikely today may 
prove to be the case in the near future, this suppression of uncertainties may obviously lead to poor 
predictions of the future.   
 
4.2 What risk perspective supports the risk regulation of Salzburg? 
The risk regulation of Salzburg needs to be linked to a broad and encompassing risk 
perspective which acknowledges uncertainty as the main component of risk. The (A,C,U) 
definition represents such a perspective.  
Here no initial standpoint is taken concerning whether EMR is detrimental to public health or 
not. This approach is more sensitive and adaptive to new information and changes in the 
knowledge base than the traditional perspective. Decisions are based on a broader and more 
diverse knowledge base. Causal evidence is not the only type of information considered. The 
more precautious nature of the Salzburgian risk regulation is based on an acknowledgement of 
the existence of scientific uncertainties about the consequences of EMR. The fact that the 
bodies of children are more receptive to EMR than fully developed ones, provides supporting 
arguments for a cautious approach. The assumptions of the regulatory actors of Salzburg 
deviate strongly from those made in the risk regulation in Stavanger.  In Salzburg the 
marginal values provided by ICNIRP are considered to be out of date and not providing 
protection against the detrimental effects of EMR. The regulatory actors also place emphasis 
on the fact that health effects are reported as low as 0.06 V/m, far below the levels of 
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exposure set by ICNIRP (1999). This limit for exposure to EMR does only account for 
thermal effect and short-term exposure not exceeding six minutes. Furthermore, the regulatory 
actors in Salzburg acknowledge that non-thermal effects may have the potential of being more 
detrimental to our health than thermal effects. They use different scientific reports (for 
instance Kundi 2009, Havas 2000, Bio-Initiative report 2007), and place emphasis on reports 
branded by NPRA as unscientific (see NPRA 2008). They also interpret the results produced 
by the Stewart Report (2000) differently from NPRA.  
The sets of assumptions and pools of evidence the cases base their decisions upon produce 
notably different levels and forms of regulatory intervention. The assumptions and the 
knowledge base of Salzburg  legitimate the precautionary measures taken, for instance the 
lowering of marginal values, the banning of wireless networks in primary schools, the formal 
procedure arranged to avoid deployment of base stations in so-called sensitive areas and the 
involvement of stakeholders in decision-making concerning the location of base stations.  
In Salzburg risk communication is not only voiced through the media; local authorities and 
members of the public communicate openly. This is illustrated by the official letters of 
recommendation and the active role of regulatory actors in providing readily available 
information for the public. 
The risk regulation of Salzburg is proactive in the sense that possible scenarios are sought, 
“identified in advance” and the possibility that these might occur affects the results of risk 
assessments and the following decision-making. The uncertainties are recognized as important 
and significantly affect the form and policies of their risk management. The traditional 
perspective does not provide a strong basis for the risk regulation of Salzburg, as the 
uncertainties are not adequately reflected in this perspective. Possible scenarios are addressed, 
the uncertain nature of the risk (concerning both the occurrence of an event and the associated 
consequences) are considered. In Salzburg the uncertainty dimension is given more weight 
than probabilities. Risk extends beyond probabilities.   
 
4.3 The two cases viewed in relation to existing risk problem classifications  
Following the risk classification scheme of HSE (2001), the risk of EMR can be classified 
under ignorance (refer to Figure 1), where we find large uncertainties about the consequences 
and about the likelihoods, or, in other words, poor background knowledge for the assigned 
probabilities. For such situations precautionary measures are required. However, such a 
conclusion is based on assessments of uncertainty and on what constitutes uncertainty. 
Obviously there are different views on the degree of uncertainties. It is likely that the 
regulatory actors in the Stavanger case would not agree with this classification of EMR as 
they do not recognize the uncertain nature of EMR. Salzburg, on the other hand, would most 
likely agree with this classification of EMR. These diverging standpoints can be illustrated by 
the practical implications manifested in the differing nature of their risk regulation; the one 
finding rationale for precaution and higher levels of regulation, the other not. 
If we adopt the Renn (2005) classification, the risk of EMR would be characterised by 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity (for definitions see Section 1). EMR can be said to 
involve the complexity dimension; this is due to the difficulty of establishing the causal nature 
of the risk, and the uncertainty dimension in that the consequences are difficult to predict. 
Furthermore, the ambiguity dimension is found in that the cases demonstrate that uncertainties 
are viewed and weighted differently. Again we see that this leads to different levels of 
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precaution and affects risk regulation Correspondingly, and as earlier pointed out, the 
connection between the (A,C,U) perspective and cautionary and precautionary measures is 
closer than for the traditional perspective. The appropriate risk management instruments, as 
recommended by Table 2, are more in line with the (A,C,U) perspective than the traditional 
perspective. The management framework of Renn (2005) is, to a large extent, founded on 
similar ideas as the (A,C,U) perspective (Aven and Renn 2009b).  
 
5. Normative implications and conclusions  
Examining the scientific basis for risk assessments and the assumptions that underlie them can 
give valuable input for politicians and decision-makers. It can also be seen as an expression of 
the risk perspective that is adopted by the risk assessors and challenge the common idea of 
experts and analysts as neutral assessors of risk. It is imperative that the assumptions and 
background knowledge are made explicit and communication on how they affect the result is 
provided by the risk assessment. This can have crucial effects on the decision reached, the 
regulatory measures taken and the corresponding levels of public protection provided. 
Risk regulation needs to be based on a risk management framework, which provides key concepts and 
principles, and clear direction and guidance on how to identify, assess and manage risk. The aim is to 
balance the conflicts inherent in exploring opportunities on the one hand, and avoiding losses, 
accidents, and disasters, on the other. Many such frameworks have been established, e.g. the AS/NZS 
4360 Risk Management Standard (AS/NZS 2004) and ISO IEC standard on risk management (ISO 
2002, 2005); see Ale et al. (2009). Although the different frameworks differ considerably when it 
comes to jargon and definitions, they are broadly similar when it comes to basic underlying ideas. 
Considerable agreement, for instance, exists on the steps needed for proper risk management: from the 
definition of critical functions to risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk control (Ale et al. 2009). 
 
However, the risk perspective is often not properly defined in these frameworks, and this is a serious 
weakness since the perspective influences the way risk is understood, assessed and managed.  The 
terminology of most of these frameworks seems to indicate a traditional risk perspective, but some are 
more in line with the (A,C,U) perspective as uncertainty is considered a main component of risk.  We 
believe that it is possible to support risk management frameworks with different risk perspectives, but 
care has to be shown when using the traditional perspective in the case of situations of large 
uncertainties and high stakes involved, such as the EMR risk.  We have seen that this perspective is 
often linked to a null hypothesis expressing that EMR is safe, and strong evidence is required to prove 
that risk-reducing measures should be implemented. Furthermore, when conducting risk assessments 
according to this perspective, important uncertainty factors are often hidden or camouflaged as pointed 
out in Section 4. One may discuss to what extent this is an aspect of the perspective or whether the 
perspective is used for a specific purpose, to demonstrate that the activity (here the use of EMR) is 
safe. Too much focus on uncertainties would not serve the interest of those who are in favour of EMR.  
 
The traditional perspective has been reviewed and discussed thoroughly in the literature; see e.g. Aven 
(2003). Ways of trying to solve the above problems have been suggested by implementing more 
comprehensive methods for revealing and assessing uncertainties. An example is the so-called 
“probability of frequency approach”, which is based on assessing epistemic uncertainties about the 
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underlying “true” risk indices by means of subjective probabilities. In this approach there are two 
levels of probability introduced: i) the relative frequency interpreted probabilities reflecting variation 
within populations (also referred to as stochastic or aleatory uncertainty), and ii) the subjective 
probabilities reflecting the analyst’s uncertainty about what the correct relative frequency probabilities 
are; see e.g. Kaplan and Garrick (1981), Paté-Cornell (1996) and Aven (2003).  However, this 
approach is also probability-based and uncertainties may be hidden in the background knowledge 
(assumptions) that the assignments are based on.  In the case of large uncertainties in the phenomena 
studied, it is difficult to assign probabilities with a sufficient rigour. More qualitative approaches may 
then be preferred. Yet, any assessment of risk following a perspective where the purpose of the 
assessment is to accurately estimate the risk may suffer from the problem of suppressing uncertainties 
as a comprehensive representation of the uncertainties is difficult to carry out in practice and does not 
necessarily serve the interest of the parties involved.   
 
A perspective where the main component of risk is uncertainty and not probability, like the (A,C,U) 
perspective, means a shift in thinking from accurate risk estimation to uncertainty characterisations. To 
many this perspective represents a new paradigm in that it allows for questions to be asked concerning 
existing knowledge, methods and established “truths”.  The aim of the risk assessments is to reveal 
uncertainties and describe them. Different parties may have different views and this is reflected in the 
risk picture established.  Such a perspective is completely different from the traditional perspective 
and is, in our view, more suited for assessing and managing risk in situations of large uncertainties and 
stakes involved. This perspective does not make it easier to take a stand on what is an acceptable risk 
or safety level, but puts the ball in the right basket: managers and politicians have the responsibility to 
balance different concerns and give weight to the uncertainties. Adopting such a perspective means 
that the practices may be as those in Salzburg, or in Stavanger. The process leading to these practices 
would, however, be more in line with the Salzburg case than that of Stavanger; this is because 
Stavanger has not revealed and reported a sufficiently broad risk and uncertainty picture to support the 
decision-making process of the politicians in the municipality.   
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Abstract  
 
The focal point of this paper is to demonstrate that a connection exists between risk 
perception and risk perspectives. Two main categories of risk perception and judgments, those 
of laymen and those of experts, will be linked to two different risk perspectives. In the 
traditional risk perspective, probability constitutes the main component of the risk concept. 
Here the probabilities are interpreted as objective properties of an activity. In the alternative 
perspective, uncertainty is considered to be the main component of risk. The paper argues that 
the risk perceptions of laypeople better match the alternative perspective than the traditional 
perspective on risk. Conversely, the way experts define and assess risks is more in line with 
the traditional perspective on risk. The connections between risk perceptions and risk 
perspectives are discussed in the paper and are accompanied and illustrated by an example of 
electromagnetic radiation from base stations and wireless networks.  The nature and 
characteristics of electromagnetic radiation as a source of risks are typically found to produce 
high risk perceptions among laypeople and low risk estimates among experts.   
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1. Introduction  
 
In today’s society, the use of wireless technologies emitting electromagnetic radiation (EMR) is 
widespread and is continuously increasing. Examples of sources of EMR are wireless networks and 
mobile masts. The potential for adverse health effects due to exposure to EMR has been and is subject 
to considerable debate. EMR represents an emerging health issue and has created a growing body of 
concerned citizens. There are, however, diverging opinions about the risk posed by EMR. Within the 
scientific community, we find a multitude of reports providing contrasting findings and conclusions 
about the possible effects of exposure to EMR.  
 
EMR as a source of risk is used to illustrate the issue addressed in this paper: the link between risk 
perception and risk perspectives. EMR possesses characteristics which commonly produce diverging 
perceptions and judgments among the general public and experts, and in the paper we show that these 
perceptions and judgments closely match two main perspectives on risk. We find that the way experts 
assess and define risk is best described by a traditional perspective on risk where probability is the 
main component of risk, whereas risk perceptions of laymen are more in line with perspectives on risk 
where uncertainty is the main component of risk. Examples of risk definitions underpinning these two 
categories of perspectives are  
 
• Risk is the combination of probability of an event and its consequences (ISO 2002) 
• Risk equals uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity (Aven and 
Renn 2009).   
 
There is a tendency that experts generally rate technological risks lower than the general public. 
Probabilities form a central part of how experts relate to and assess risks, whereas uncertainties 
constitute the main pillar of risk perceptions of laymen. In the case of the general public, the 
probabilities do not shape the risk perceptions to the same degree as for experts. When uncertainty 
related to the consequences of an activity (for example EMR) exists, the mere possibility that these 
adverse effects could occur can lead the public to judge this source as a high risk. This phenomenon is 
well known from the risk perception literature; see e.g. Sjøberg and Drottz-Sjøberg (1994). In their 
work Sjøberg and Drottz-Sjøberg (1994)  found that people who used the term  “risk” as mainly 
related to or synonymous with the probability for an event, overall rated risks lower than those who 
define risk in terms of consequences of an event. This is also in line with what Siegrist et al. (2006) 
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find, namely that many laypeople are concerned with technological risk despite the fact that risk 
assessments often indicate a low probability of adverse effects.  
 
The uncertainty concerning the effects of EMR and how one relates to these in different manners, can 
serve to illustrate important points of the analysis provided in this paper. Contrasting risk perceptions 
can be a result of the degree to which one focuses on and emphasizes the uncertainty component of the 
risk. Correspondingly, we also find different levels of emphasis on uncertainty in the two perspectives 
on risk presented and discussed in this paper.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give a short review of the two risk perspectives 
introduced above and basic theory of risk perception. This provides a background for the discussions 
in the coming section, where we link the different perceptions to the risk perspectives. Finally, some 
conclusions are drawn in Section 4. 
 
2. Basic introduction to risk perspectives and risk perception    
 
2.1  Risk perspectives 
Many perspectives on risk exist; see e.g. Aven and Renn (2009). In this paper we distinguish between 
the following two main categories:   
5. The main component of risk is probability, and this probability is interpreted as an objective 
property of the activity being studied.  This perspective is referred to as the traditional risk 
perspective.    
6. The main component of risk is uncertainty, and probability is considered a knowledge-based 
(subjective) tool for expressing these uncertainties. It is acknowledged that risk extends 
beyond probabilities. This perspective is referred to as the alternative risk perspective.  
In the traditional risk perspective, risk is defined by a probability or probability distribution, 
expressing stochastic or aleatory uncertainties.  A population of similar situations to the one studied is 
constructed and the probability p of an event A equals the fraction of situations where A occurs. The 
probability p is unknown and is estimated based on “hard data”, i.e. measurements related to the 
occurrence of A for similar situations. Analogously, we define a probability distribution pX associated 
with a random variable X. Modelling of the phenomena may also be used, linking the probability p to 
a set of parameters q on a more detailed system level.  More generally, we may consider the 
perspective based on a probability model F which is assumed dependent on some unknown parameters 
µ.  The estimation of µ is based on traditional statistical methods, e.g. regression analysis.   
Hence, risk is defined by p and pX, and the associated risk description covers the estimates of these 
quantities. Uncertainties of these estimates relative to the “true” values of p should be addressed but 
are often neglected or restricted to simple confidence intervals reflecting only statistical variation.  
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In the alternative risk perspective, uncertainty and not probability is the main component of risk.  
Different definitions of risk can support such a perspective, as discussed in Aven and Renn (2009) and 
Aven (2008).  In this paper we adopt the following perspective (Aven 2008):  
By risk we understand the two-dimensional combination of 
iii) events A and the consequences of these events C, and 
iv) the associated uncertainties U (will A occur and what value will C take?)          (I) 
 
We refer to this as the (A,C,U) perspective.  
 
We may rephrase this definition by saying that risk associated with an activity is to be understood as 
(Aven and Renn 2009): 
Uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity    (I’).  
 
Here, severity refers to intensity, size, extension, scope and other potential measures of magnitude, 
and is with respect to something that humans value (lives, the environment, money, etc.). Losses and 
gains, for example expressed by money or the number of fatalities, are ways of defining the severity of 
the consequences. The uncertainties relate to the events and consequences, the severity is just a way of 
characterising the consequences (Aven and Renn 2009).  
 
The main features of this risk perspective are illustrated in Figure 1.     
 
 
Activity
Events and 
consequences
(outcomes)
Uncertainty
Risk 
Values at stake Values at stake 
Severity
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the risk definition (Aven and Renn 2009) 
 
 
It is acknowledged that risk extends beyond probabilities. Probability is considered a knowledge-based 
(subjective) tool for expressing these uncertainties. If the probability equals 0.1 (say), this means that 
the assessor compares his/her uncertainty (degree of belief) about the occurrence of the event A with 
the standard of drawing at random a specific ball from an urn that contains 10 balls (Lindley 2006). A 
29 
 
risk description based on this perspective includes the following elements: (A,C,U,P,K), where A 
refers to the initiating event, C represents the consequences given the occurrence of the event A, U is 
the uncertainty about A and C, P is the probability of specific events and  consequences, and K is the 
background knowledge that the assessments are based on.  This background knowledge comprises 
data, expert judgments and models and is often expressed through assumptions.  
 
Hence objective risk descriptions do not exist, as the U and P components are epistemic. The risk 
description (A,C,U,P,K) covers probability distributions of A and C, as well as predictions of A and C, 
for example a predictor C* given by the expected value of C, unconditionally or conditional on the 
occurrence of A, i.e. C* = EC or C* = E[C|A].   
2.2 Risk perception 
 
Risk perception is a judgment (belief, appraisal) held by an individual, group, or society about risk. 
These perceptions are based on personal beliefs, ideas about effects and experiences. Irrespective of 
their validity, these factors form risk perception. Risk perception covers both perceived seriousness of 
risk and also judgments about acceptability of risk (Renn 2008). 
 
Risk perceptions may be influenced by professional risk assessments, the individual’s own risk 
assessment and perceptional factors such as fear, affect and perceived control. Often the latter factors 
are the most important in shaping risk perception. This is well known from risk perception research 
(see e.g Fischhoff 1995, Renn 2008, Slovic 1992). The intrinsic characteristics and nature of the 
technological risk in question, EMR, typically elevate risk perception among the general population 
relative to experts. Examples of characteristics that serve to heighten the risk perception are: large 
uncertainties concerning consequences, potential for serious and irreversible effects, involuntariness 
and invisibility of exposure, man-made and unnatural sources, negative associations attached to words 
like ‘radiation’ and ‘base station’, and the fact that the risk is being controlled by others. 
 
Scientific assessments influence individual responses to risk only to the degree that they are integrated 
in the individual perceptions (Renn 2008). This is in line with the citation of Slovic: “New evidence 
appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one’s initial beliefs, contrary evidence is 
dismissed as unreliable, erroneous or unrepresentative” (Slovic et al. 1979:72). Siegrist et al. (2006) 
studied how one relates to studies and results concerning wireless technologies and found support for 
this phenomenon. Furthermore, they found that one relies to a greater extent on studies and reports 
showing risk than on those showing no risk. Siegrist et al. (2006) hold that the results of their study 
suggest that these biases may be part of the reason why laypeople are concerned with technological 
risk despite the fact that risk assessments indicate a low probability of adverse effects.  
 
Risk perceptions are, to a varying degree, governed by results of risk assessments and for many, risk 
perceptions extend far beyond the risk assessments’ results. Different factors form the risk perception 
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of the public and experts. Experts generally rely on risk assessments to a greater extent than laymen. 
Even if risk assessments demonstrate low risk, laymen can perceive the risk as high and unacceptable. 
In the words of Sjøberg and Drottz-Sjøberg (1994), “risks exist in a cognitive framework of values and 
standards”. Laymen and experts tend to evaluate and judge risk differently. This is common for the 
type of technological risk discussed in this paper.  
 
 
 
 
3. Discussion 
 
The focal point of the discussion in this section is to show how differently one can relate to 
uncertainties and how this can shape risk perceptions. Using the two risk perspectives defined 
in the previous section as points of reference, we are able to link the diverging role of 
uncertainty in forming risk perceptions and the different ways of addressing uncertainty in the 
risk assessment following the traditional and the alternative perspectives.  
Table 1 (next page) summarizes the main distinctions between the two risk perspectives 
considered and provides links to risk perception. It will be used as a reference for the 
discussion in this section. We do not hold that the different ways we perceive risks are 
founded on specified risk perspectives, but we argue that they fit in with the two main lines of 
thinking described in Section 2.1.    
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Table 1:  Characterisation of the two risk perspectives considered and links to risk perception 
Risk 
perspective  
Characterisation of the perspective Possible link to risk perception  
     
Traditional 
risk 
perspective  
Focus on 
estimation of 
“objective” 
probabilities 
and risk  
The background 
knowledge K that the 
probability  estimates 
are based on is 
narrow in the sense 
that it is  based on 
“hard data” only  
 
Experts place weight on 
risk assessments’ results; 
they view the results as 
representing the real risk  
 
Experts have limited 
focus on uncertainties.   
If uncertainties are  
described, narrow 
perspectives are often 
used (key uncertainty 
factors not included) 
 
For the experts,  
low computed 
probabilities equal low 
risk, and perceptional 
factors such as dread and 
fear are considered 
irrelevant for describing 
risk  
 
Laypeople may  perceive 
risk as high even if the 
computed probabilities are 
relatively low and below 
levels normally 
considered as acceptable    
 
A null hypothesis is 
assumed to be true:  
the activity is safe, 
the probability P of 
an adverse event is 
below a threshold 
P0.  
Strong evidence is 
needed to prove that  
P > P0 and thus the 
risk is too high   
 
 
 
 
 
Alternative 
risk 
perspective  
(A,C,U) 
 
Focus on  
description of 
uncertainties  
 
All types of 
information and 
knowledge are used 
as a basis for the 
uncertainty 
description 
 
Experts acknowledge that 
risk is more than 
computed probabilities.  
Uncertainty is a 
fundamental component 
of risk and risk perception 
(in particular for laymen) 
 
There is no 
underlying 
hypothesis about the 
activity being safe 
or not  
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 is strongly influenced by 
the uncertainties.   
 
For laymen, the potential 
for serious consequences 
often means  high risk 
perception 
 
Laymen in their risk 
perceptions typically give 
more weight to the   
uncertainties and the 
perceptional factors 
(dread, fear, etc.)  than the 
computed probabilities  
 
 
 
3.1 What risk perspective best matches the risk judgments of experts? 
 
Experts rely to a great extent on risk assessments and these are central in forming how they 
rate risks. These risk assessments are of the traditional type. In the traditional perspective, risk 
is defined by probabilities and is seen as an objective property of the activity studied. Risk 
assessments provide risk estimates of an assumed “objective” and “real” risk.  Uncertainty is 
taken into account only to the degree to which the estimates deviate from the “real” and “true” 
underlying risk. Prevailing risk assessment practice often hides or camouflages these 
uncertainties (Reid 1992, Stirling 2007, Renn 1998, Aven 2008) as discussed in the following.  
In this way, risk estimates can be generated with a stronger basis than justified. Given the 
constant redefinition of the state of knowledge concerning “new” technologies and the fact 
that situations that may seem unlikely today may prove to be the case in the near future, this 
suppression of uncertainties may lead to poor predictions of the future.   
Risk numbers are based on available statistical and historical data, and these data can in some cases be 
good indications for some future situations. But for the case of EMR and possible adverse 
consequences, where we experience large uncertainties and contradictory scientific findings, this 
historical database would not provide reliable information for future situations. Consequently, risk 
estimates based on historical data available would indicate that EMR represents no risk to human 
health. Possible extreme scenarios are given little weight because available data provide no evidence 
of these to be realistic. Solely relying on results from risk assessments of the traditional approach 
could cover surprising situations and lead to significant under-estimations/under-prediction of the true 
values.  
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Experts emphasize probabilities, whereas laymen tend to focus on consequences and uncertainties. 
Risk assessment is a significant factor in forming how experts define and rate risks. The results 
provided by the risk assessment would typically be seen by experts as representing the real risk. So, if 
the risk assessments are in line with the traditional statistical approach and if risk numbers 
demonstrate low risk values for EMR, experts will generally find EMR as representing an acceptable 
risk irrespective of the potential for negative consequences.  One relies on the fact that research has 
not yet been able to prove a causal relationship between EMR and public health effects. In the 
traditional perspective, it is only when sufficient data exist “proving” that the probability of an adverse 
event P is exceeding a given threshold value P0, that it can be concluded that EMR is risky. This can 
be seen as a reactive approach to risks. It would be more serious to wrongly conclude that EMR is 
risky, than to wrongly conclude that EMR is safe. This is, of course, a highly controversial stand, but it 
is often associated with the traditional perspective. This requirement for “sufficient” causal evidence 
can be interpreted to be in line with the idea of risk as an objective property existing independently of 
us and in line with the search for certainty associated with the traditional perspective.  
 
Furthermore, perceptional factors like dread, fear and affect are considered irrelevant for describing 
risk in the eyes of the experts and in the traditional perspective on risk. Together with value 
judgments, these factors may describe why laypeople may perceive risk as high irrespective of the fact 
that computed probabilities are relatively low and below levels normally considered as acceptable.    
 
 
3.2 What risk perspective best matches the risk perceptions of laymen? 
The risk perceptions of laymen need to be seen in relation to a broader and more 
encompassing risk perspective than the traditional perspective. The (A,C,U) definition 
represents such a perspective. Here, uncertainty is considered the main component of risk. 
This uncertainty addressed in this perspective is epistemic and refers to a lack of knowledge at 
a certain point in time. Risk perceptions of laymen are based on a broader and more diverse 
knowledge base than in the case of experts. Risk assessments’ results and causal evidence 
shape the risk perceptions of the general public, but often only to a limited degree. Despite 
scientific studies and risk assessment demonstrating low risk, the public may perceive the risk 
as high and unacceptable. Furthermore, as noted in Section 2.2, laymen are susceptible to 
relying more heavily on risk assessments consistent with prior beliefs and attitudes and those 
demonstrating risk, than on those contradicting prior standpoints and those showing no risk 
(Siegrist et al. 2006). The leniency towards evidence integrated with prior standpoints can 
also be said to hold for experts, but this phenomenon is more pronounced for laymen.   
This alternative approach is more sensitive and adaptive to new information and changes in 
the knowledge base than the traditional perspective. The existence of scientific uncertainties 
about the consequences of EMR is acknowledged. The sets of assumptions and pools of 
evidence the cases base their judgments on can be notably different from those of experts. 
Many citizens want wireless networks out of schools and want base stations located further 
away from public areas. This is not the case for the majority of the experts. 
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This approach can be said to be more proactive in the sense that more extreme and uncommon 
scenarios are addressed and can be “identified in advance” than in the traditional perspective. 
Possibilities of such situations occurring will, to a greater extent, be included as a part of the results of 
risk assessments conducted following the alternative approach. This is in line with how laymen 
generally perceive technological risks; the uncertain nature of the risk is recognized as important and it 
significantly affects their judgments. It is more likely that possible extreme situations and outcomes 
will be identified, than when the point of departure for the risk assessments are historical data and 
historical-based probabilistic analyses based on strong assumptions. Such data may prove to be 
irrelevant for future situations and will not be weighted in the same manner as in the traditional 
perspective. 
  
The traditional perspective does not provide a strong basis for the risk perceptions of laymen, as the 
uncertainties are not adequately reflected in this perspective. For laymen, risk extends beyond 
probabilities, as in the alternative perspective. This can be clearly illustrated by the fact that despite 
much research finding that exposure to EMR within the established marginal limits is safe, many 
laymen hold that exposure to EMR is risky. The risk perception is based on a broad set of factors, as 
illustrated by Figure 2. In the figure we see that risk perception is not the same as professional risk 
characterisations, if we make a clear distinction between risk and uncertainty assessments and value 
judgments. An event, A, and its consequences, C, are subject to uncertainties, U. We may use 
probabilities, P, to express these uncertainties, but one needs to note that this is a separate domain 
from judgments about to what extent we like or dislike A, C, U and P. This latter domain is the value 
judgments. So again, we see that risk perception includes both an assessment aspect and a value 
judgment aspect. Furthermore, this figure captures the cornerstone of the alternative perspective as it 
illustrates the uncertainties in the risk concept concerning both the events and the consequences of 
these. The figure merges the two concepts of risk perspective and risk perception.   
  
 
 
Activity
A,C
U,P (analysts)
U,P (you)
Your risk 
perceptionRisk 
description
(analysts)
Contextual
factors
(e.g.trust) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of what influences risk perception. A: Events, C: Consequences, U: Uncertainty, P: 
Probability  (Aven 2010) 
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4. Conclusion and normative implications 
 
We have provided links between risk perspectives and risk perceptions. We have found that a 
connection and similar lines of thinking exist between the traditional perspective and how 
experts assess risks.   
The risk perceptions of laymen best match the alternative (A,C,U) perspective,  where 
uncertainties are emphasized and treated as the most central component of risk.  There is a 
tendency for experts to range technological risks as low, whereas laymen generally label these 
as high and unacceptable risks. The example of EMR illustrates this tendency. EMR possesses 
characteristics that typically elevate risk perceptions among laymen and typically produce low 
risk estimates among experts. Examples of such characteristics are: large uncertainties 
concerning consequences, potential for serious and irreversible effects, involuntariness and 
invisibility of exposure and the source of exposure being man-made. 
Laypeople often range technological risks as high, despite the fact that risk assessments indicate a low 
probability of adverse effects. This also holds for the example of EMR and can be explained by the 
fact that risk perceptions cover two dimensions: how we relate to assessment results and our value 
judgments.  Laymen relate to uncertainties concerning the effects of EMR in a manner different from 
experts. The contrasting points of view concerning EMR between these two groups can be seen a 
result of the degree to which they focus on the different components of the risk concept. Laymen focus 
on uncertainties and consequences, whereas the experts typically emphasize probabilities. This 
corresponds with the weight put on the different components of the risk concept in the two risk 
perspectives.  
We find that the alternative perceptive is better suited to assess risks where large uncertainties exist 
and stakes are high, as in the case of EMR where scientific studies provide contradictory conclusions 
and findings and the potential consequences can be serious. Only using historical data to assign 
probabilities in relation to EMR, as in the traditional perspective, can prove to be dangerous and can 
be seen as a reactive approach. To fully express risk, we need to see beyond historical data and 
traditional probability estimates. This is secured in the alternative perspective where the main 
component of risk is uncertainty and not probability. This perspective represents a shift in thinking 
from accurate risk estimation to uncertainty characterisations.  
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